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receiver. Under standard assumptions, an optimal signal reveals the states below
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1. Introduction
Consider a sender who seeks to influence beliefs and actions of a receiver by disclosing
information. Specifically, suppose that the sender can design a procedure for obtaining
and revealing information about a state of the world to the receiver. In many situ-
ations, the sender reveals some states and pools (censors) the other states. We focus
on upper-censorship policies that reveal the states below a cutoff and pool the states
above this cutoff. We derive simple conditions under which such upper-censorship
policies are robustly optimal. We also provide monotone comparative statics results
on the informativeness of the optimal signal.
In our model, the receiver chooses whether to act or not. If the receiver does not
act, the sender and receiver’s utilities are normalized to zero. If the receiver acts, the
sender and receiver’s utilities depend on a state of the world and a type of the receiver.
The state and type are independent random variables that represent, respectively,
the receiver’s benefit and cost from action. We assume that the type is a continuous
random variable, but we allow the state to be either a continuous or discrete random
variable.1
The sender is biased and may wish to persuade the receiver to act against the receiver’s
best interest. Specifically, the sender’s expected utility is a weighted sum of the
probability that the receiver acts and the receiver’s expected utility.2 The sender and
receiver share a common prior about the state; the receiver privately knows his type.
To influence the receiver’s choice, the sender designs a signal that reveals information
about the state. After observing the signal realization, the receiver updates his beliefs
about the state and makes a choice that maximizes his expected utility.
The main result shows that if the probability density of the receiver’s type is log-
concave, then, and only then, upper-censorship is optimal for all prior distributions
of the state and for all weights that the sender puts on the receiver’s utility. Many
commonly used probability densities are log-concave (see Table 1 in Bagnoli and
Bergstrom 2005). Log-concave densities are well-behaved and exhibit nice properties,
such as single-peakedness and the monotonicity of the hazard rates.
When upper-censorship is optimal, it is possible to perform the comparative statics
analysis on the informativeness of the optimal signal. We show that the optimal
signal is less informative if the sender is more biased and if the receiver is easier to
persuade.
We apply our results to the problem of media censorship by the government. We
consider a stylized setting with a continuum of media outlets and a continuum of
citizens (receivers). We extend the model to permit the aggregate action of the
citizens to affect their utility but not their optimal actions. For example, an election
1Extending the analysis to the case where the state and type are general random variable presents
technical difficulties but does not yield new economic insights.
2In the paper, we consider a more general utility function of the sender.
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outcome impacts all citizens but does not change their preferences over candidates.
The government wishes to influence citizens’ actions by deciding which media outlets
are to be censored. We show that if the probability density of the citizens’ types is log-
concave, then the optimal media censorship policy prescribes to permit all sufficiently
loyal media outlets and to censor the remaining outlets.
Related Literature. This paper presents a theory of optimal Bayesian persuasion in
environments where payoffs are linear in the state. The literature on Bayesian persua-
sion was set in motion by the seminal papers of Rayo and Segal (2010) and Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011). Linear persuasion is a workhorse environment for Bayesian
persuasion literature. The leading example in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) is lin-
ear with two states. Linear persuasion has been studied by Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011), Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016), Kolotilin, Mylovanov, Zapechelnyuk, and Li
(2017), Kolotilin (2017), and Dworczak and Martini (2018). Linear persuasion has
been applied, for example, to selection of projects in organizations in Boleslavsky
and Cotton (2018), school grading policies in Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010), trad-
ing mechanisms with resale opportunities in Dworczak (2017), macroprudential stress
tests in Orlov, Zryumov, and Skrzypach (2018), transparency benchmarks in over-
the-counter markets in Duffie, Dworczak, and Zhu (2017), clinical trials in Kolotilin
(2015), media control in Gehlbach and Sonin (2014), and voter persuasion in Alonso
and Caˆmara (2016a,b), stress tests for financial institutions in Goldstein and Leitner
(2018).
Our paper provides necessary and sufficient prior independent conditions for random-
ized censorship to be optimal. In addition, we establish monotone comparative statics
results on the informativeness of the optimal signal. Kolotilin (2017) provides neces-
sary and sufficient prior dependent conditions for optimality of randomized censorship.
In various contexts, sufficient conditions for optimality of randomized censorship have
been provided by Alonso and Caˆmara (2016b), Kolotilin, Mylovanov, Zapechelnyuk,
and Li (2017), and Dworczak and Martini (2018). Alonso and Caˆmara (2016b) es-
tablish related comparative statics results for the case of a finite number of states.
2. Model
2.1. Setup. There are two players: a sender (she) and a receiver (he). The receiver
chooses whether to accept a proposal (a = 1) or reject it (a = 0). The proposal
has an uncertain value ω ∈ [0, 1]. By accepting the proposal, the receiver forgoes
an outside option worth r ∈ [0, 1], so the receiver’s utility is a(ω − r). The sender’s
utility is av(ω, r), where v(ω, r) is linear in ω and continuously differentiable in r.
We will refer to ω as state and to r as type, and denote by F and G, respectively,
their distributions. Throughout the paper we assume that distribution G of the type
is twice continuously differentiable.3 As in many applications the state is either a
continuous or discrete random variable, we will separately analyze these two cases.
3This assumption is made for clarity of exposition. The results can be extended to general G.
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The receiver privately knows his type, but he does not observe the state. The sender
can influence the action taken by the receiver, a = 1 or a = 0, by releasing a signal
that reveals information about the state. A signal is a random variable s ∈ [0, 1]
that is independent of r but, possibly, correlated with ω. For example, s is fully
revealing if it is perfectly correlated with ω, and s is completely uninformative if it is
independent of ω.
We are interested in an optimal signal that maximizes the sender’s expected utility
among all signals.
The timing is as follows. First, the sender publicly chooses a signal s. Then, realiz-
ations of ω, r, and s are drawn. Finally, the receiver observes the realizations of his
type r and the signal s, and then chooses between a = 0 and a = 1.
2.2. Upper Censorship. A subset of signals called upper censorship will play a
special role in this paper.
An upper-censorship signal reveals the states below a specified cutoff and pools the
states above this cutoff. If the state is continuous, it does not matter whether state
is revealed or pooled when it is equal to the cutoff, because this is a zero probability
event. However, if the state is discrete, we will distinguish between deterministic and
stochastic upper-censorship signals, depending on what happens when the state is
equal to the cutoff.
A lower-censorship signal is defined symmetrically: it pools the states below a spe-
cified cutoff and reveals the states above this cutoff. For clarity of exposition, we
focus on upper-censorship throughout the paper. The same results will hold if we
replace upper-censorship by lower-censorship and v(ω, r) by −v(ω, r).
A signal s is deterministic upper-censorship if there exists a cutoff ω∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that
the states strictly below ω∗ are revealed and the states weakly above ω∗ are pooled.
This signal induces a monotone partition of the state space [0, 1] into a continuum
[0, ω∗) of partition elements where ω is revealed and a single partition element [ω∗, 1]
where a pooling message is sent. For example, s can be expressed as
s =
{
ω, if ω < ω∗,
m∗, if ω ≥ ω∗,
where
m∗ = E[ω|ω ≥ ω∗]
is the expected state conditional on being above the cutoff. Note that the fully
informative signal and the completely uninformative signal are deterministic upper-
censorship signals with cutoffs ω∗ = 1 and ω∗ = 0, respectively.
A signal is stochastic upper-censorship if there exists a cutoff ω∗ ∈ [0, 1] and a prob-
ability q∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that the states below ω∗ are revealed, the states above ω∗
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are pooled, and the state ω = ω∗ is revealed with probability q∗ and pooled with
probability 1− q∗. For example,
s =

ω with probability one, if ω < ω∗,
ω∗ and m¯(ω∗, q∗) with probabilities q∗ and 1− q∗, if ω = ω∗,
m¯(ω∗, q∗) with probability one, if ω > ω∗,
where
m¯(ω∗, q∗) =
∫
(ω∗,1] ωdF (ω) + ω
∗(1− q∗) Pr(ω = ω∗)∫
(ω∗,1] dF (ω) + (1− q∗) Pr(ω = ω∗)
is the posterior expected state induced by the pooling signal. Note that a stochastic
upper-censorship signal s with parameters (ω∗, q∗) is a monotone partition if and only
if q∗ ∈ {0, 1}, in which case s can be expressed as a deterministic upper-censorship
signal.
2.3. Benchmark. For illustration of the difference between the cases with continuous
and discrete state, we solve a benchmark example where there is no uncertainty about
the receiver’s type.
Let the state ω have the expected value E[ω] = 1/2, and let the receiver’s type r be
known to sender and satisfy r > 1/2. In addition, let v(ω, r) = 1 for all ω and all r,
so the sender wishes to maximize the probability of the receiver’s acceptance of the
proposal.
Observe that if the sender reveals no information about ω, the receiver will evaluate
ω by its expected value of 1/2, thus having the utility 1/2− r < 0 from accepting the
proposal. So, revealing no information makes the receiver reject the proposal with
certainty. The sender can do better by fully revealing ω. In this case, the proposal is
accepted with the probability that the state is at least as high as the type, Pr[ω ≥ r].
However, the sender can do even better pooling the states above r with states below
r while keeping the expected state at least r. Thus, the receiver who is unable to
distinguish between the states in the pool will accept the proposal in all of them.
To illustrate the case of the continuous state, suppose that ω is uniformly distributed
on [0, 1]. The largest pool that maintains the posterior expectation at least r is the
interval [2r − 1, 1]. Indeed, once the receiver learns that ω ∈ [2r − 1, 1], given the
uniform prior of ω, the posterior expected state is r. So the proposal is accepted when
ω ≥ 2r− 1 and rejected when ω < 2r− 1.4 Thus, the deterministic upper-censorship
signal with cutoff ω∗ = 2r − 1 is optimal. The sender’s expected utility is equal to
Pr[proposal is accepted] = Pr[ω ≥ 2r − 1] = 2(1− r),
4Whether states strictly below ω∗ are revealed or pooled among themselves does not matter,
because they all are strictly below r and, thus, induce action a = 0 of the receiver. In particular,
these states can be revealed.
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which is twice as much as that from the fully revealing signal:
Pr[proposal is accepted] = Pr[ω ≥ r] = 1− r.
When ω is a discrete random variable, an optimal way to reveal information about
ω takes the form of stochastic upper censorship. For illustration, suppose that ω can
only be 0 or 1, equally likely. Now, simply pooling any states is not helpful for the
sender. Pooling 0 and 1 yields the posterior expected state of 1/2, which is smaller
than the type r, resulting in the rejection of the proposal; including any other states
in the pool makes no difference as these states never occur. However, the sender can
do better by partial (stochastic) pooling. If ω = 1, let the message be “high” with
certainty. If ω = 0, let the message be “low” with some probability q and “high” with
the complementary probability. So, when the receiver observes “high”, the posterior
expected state is
E[ω|“high”] = Pr[ω = 1]
Pr[ω = 1] + Pr[ω = 0] · (1− q) =
1/2
1/2 + 1/2 · (1− q) =
1
2− q .
The sender now finds the lowest q subject to 1/(2− q) ≥ r, which yields q∗ = r−1/2.
Thus, stochastic upper censorship with ω∗ = 0 and q∗ = r − 1/2 is optimal. The
probability of the receiver accepting the proposal is exactly the probability that the
message is “high”:
Pr[proposal is accepted] = Pr[ω = 1] + Pr[ω = 0] · (1− q∗) = 1
2
+
1
2
· 1− r
r
=
1
2r
.
This is strictly greater than that from the fully revealing signal:
Pr[proposal is accepted] = Pr[ω ≥ r] = Pr[ω = 1] = 1
2
.
To sum up, in this example, an optimal signal is a deterministic upper-censorship
when the state is continuous and it is a stochastic upper-censorship when the state
is discrete. In the remainder of the paper we will show how this extends to the case
of the uncertain type of the receiver.
3. Continuous State
In many applications, the state is either a continuous random variable or a discrete
random variable. In this section, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for
optimality of a simple class of signals called upper-censorship when state is continuous.
We analyze the case of discrete state in the next section.
Let m be the expected state conditional on observing a realization of a signal s.
Because that the sender and receiver’s utilities are linear in ω, they depend on the
information about ω revealed by signal s only through the expected state m. In
particular, the receiver chooses a = 1 if and only if r ≤ m.
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Let V (m) denote the indirect utility of the sender conditional on m,
V (m) =
∫
r≤m
E [v(ω, r)|m] g(r)dr =
∫ m
0
v(m, r)g(r)dr, m ∈ [0, 1]. (1)
where E [v(ω, r)|m] = v(m, r) by the linearity of v in ω.
A function V is said to be S-shaped if it is convex below some threshold and concave
above that threshold, or, equivalently, if V ′′ is single-crossing from above:
there exists m′ such that V ′′(m) ≥ (≤) 0 for all m < (>)m′.
We now provide the criterion for the optimality of upper-censorship.
Theorem 1. Let V be S-shaped. Then, and only then, an optimal signal is determ-
inistic upper-censorship for all F .
As follows from this theorem, optimal persuasion takes a simple form of upper-
censorship whenever V is S-shaped. In this case, the sender’s optimization problem
is reduced to finding an optimal censorship cutoff ω∗. Moreover, this result is tight,
in the sense that if V is not S-shaped, then there exists a distribution F of the state
such that no upper-censorship signal is optimal.
The intuition behind Theorem 1 is as follows. Observe that when no information
about the state is revealed, the receiver’s best-response action does not change with
the state. The more information is revealed, the more variable the receiver’s behavior
will be in response to this information. Consider an interval of states where V (ω) is
concave. The sender would prefer not to reveal any information over this interval,
since a certain outcome is preferred to any lottery with the same expected state.
Conversely, consider an interval of states where V (ω) is convex. The sender would
prefer to fully reveal the state in this interval, since now lotteries are preferred. If
V is S-shaped, that is, it is convex below some threshold and concave above that
threshold, the induced optimal persuasion takes the form of upper-censorship.
It is straightforward to verify that the necessary and sufficient condition for optimality
of lower-censorship is symmetric.
Corollary 1. Let −V be S-shaped. Then, and only then, an optimal signal is de-
terministic lower-censorship for all F .
Let s be upper-censorship with a cutoff ω∗. If the realized state ω is below the
cutoff, then it is revealed to the receiver, so the expected utility of the sender is
V (ω). If the realized state ω is above the cutoff, then the posterior expected state
is m∗ = E[ω|ω ≥ ω∗], so the expected utility of the sender conditional on ω > ω∗ is
V (m∗). The sender thus needs to solve the problem
max
ω∗∈[0,1]
∫ ω∗
0
V (ω)f(ω)dω +
∫ 1
ω∗
V (m∗)f(ω)dω. (2)
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1ω∗
V (ω)
separating pooling
m∗0
Figure 1. Optimal upper-censorship with cutoff ω∗.
Proposition 1. Let V be S-shaped. There exists an optimal deterministic upper-
censorship signal with a cutoff ω∗ that satisfies
V (ω)− V (m∗) + V ′(m∗)(m∗ − ω) ≥ (≤) 0 for all ω ≤ (≥)ω∗. (3)
The expression in (3) represents the first-order condition and captures three possible
cases: the boundary solutions ω∗ = 0 and ω∗ = 1 if the expression in (3) has the same
sign for all ω, and an interior solution ω∗ such that
V (ω∗)− V (m∗) + V ′(m∗)(m∗ − ω∗) = 0. (4)
This first-order condition is illustrated by Fig. 1. The solid line is V (ω), and the
dashed line is V (m∗)− V ′(m∗)(m∗ − ω), which is the tangent line to V at m∗.
The solution of the sender’s problem (2) is particularly simple if V is either globally
convex or globally concave. In this case, the first-order condition in (3) has a constant
sign, so either ω∗ = 0 or ω∗ = 1 must be optimal. If V is convex, then ω∗ = 1 is
optimal, which corresponds the fully informative signal. Similarly, if V is concave,
then ω∗ = 0 is optimal, which corresponds the completely uninformative signal. This
is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. An optimal signal is
(a) fully informative for all F if and only if V is convex,
(b) completely uninformative for all F if and only if V is concave.
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3.1. Constant Bias. We now impose more structure on the sender’s utility, which
is relevant in many applications. We assume that
v (ω, r) = 1 + ρ(ω − r), ρ ∈ R,
g is strictly positive.
(A1)
That is, the sender’s utility is a weighted sum of the receiver’s utility and action.
The sender is biased towards a = 1 but also puts a weight ρ on the receiver’s utility.
In particular, if the weight ρ is large, then the sender’s and receiver’s interests are
aligned, whereas if the weight is zero, then the sender cares only about a.
The density g of the receiver’s type r is said to be log-concave if ln g(r) is concave in
r. Note that ln g(r) is well defined by Assumption (A1).
Under Assumption (A1), the shape of the sender’s indirect utility V defined by (1) is
connected to the shape of the density g of the receiver’s type as follows.
Lemma 1. Let (A1) hold. Then V is S-shaped for all ρ if and only if g is log-concave.
That is, if the density of the receiver’s type g is log-concave, then the sender’s indirect
utility V is S-shaped. Moreover, this result is tight, in the sense that if g is not log-
concave, then there exists ρ such that V is not S-shaped.
By Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, we obtain a criterion for the optimality of upper-
censorship with the condition on the primitive of the model, the density g.
Theorem 2. Let (A1) hold and let the density g be log-concave. Then, and only then,
an optimal signal is deterministic upper-censorship for all F and all ρ.
The symmetric statement is also true: an optimal signal is lower-censorship for all F
and all ρ if and only if −g is log-concave. Consequently, if both g and −g are log-
concave (that is, g is exponential), then there exists an optimal signal which is both
upper- and lower-censorship. There are only two signals with this property: fully
informative and completely uninformative. This allows to obtain conditions on the
distribution of the receiver’s type under which the optimal signal polarizes between
fully informative and completely uninformative signals, as, for example, in Lewis and
Sappington (1994) and Johnson and Myatt (2006).
Corollary 3. Let (A1) hold. An optimal signal is either fully informative or com-
pletely uninformative for all F and all ρ if and only if there exist λ ∈ R and c > 0
such that g(r) = ce−λr for r ∈ [0, 1].
If g(r) = ce−λr, then the fully informative signal is optimal whenever ρ ≤ −λ and
the completely uninformative signal is optimal whenever ρ ≥ −λ (and any signal is
optimal when ρ = −λ). In particular, if ρ = 0, the optimal signal is fully determined
by the sign of λ, which is in turn determined by whether the mean of r is greater or
smaller than 1/2.
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3.2. Comparative Statics. Theorem 2 allows for a sharp comparative statics ana-
lysis on the amount of information that is optimally disclosed by the sender.
We compare signals by their Blackwell informativeness (Blackwell, 1953). To compare
upper-censorship signals s1 and s2, we only need to compare their cutoffs ω
∗
1 and ω
∗
2.
Signal s1 is more informative than signal s2 if ω
∗
1 ≥ ω∗2. Indeed, state ω ∈ [0, ω∗2) is
fully revealed by both s1 and s2, and state ω ∈ [ω∗2, 1] is partially revealed by s1 and
not revealed at all by s2, so s1 is more Blackwell informative than s2.
For the purpose of comparison, we extend the definition of density function g to the
real line and assume that g is log-concave. Consider a family of densities gt of the
receiver’s type
gt (r) = g (r − t) ,
where t ∈ R is a parameter. Because gt is log-concave on [0, 1] for every t, an upper-
censorship mechanism is optimal by Theorem 2. Let ω∗ (ρ, t) ∈ [0, 1] be the optimal
upper-censorship cutoff as given by Proposition 1.
We now show that the sender optimally discloses more information when she is less
biased relative to the receiver (the bias parameter ρ is greater), and when the receiver
is more reluctant to act (the shift parameter t is greater).
Theorem 3. Let (A1) hold. For all ρ and t
(a) ω∗ (ρ, t) is increasing in ρ,
(b) ω∗ (ρ, t) is increasing in t.
The intuition for part (a) is that for a higher ρ, the sender puts more weight on
the receiver’s utility, so she optimally endows the receiver with a higher utility by
providing more information.
The intuition for part (b) is that for a higher t, each type of the receiver has a greater
cost of action, so to persuade the same type of the receiver, the sender needs to
increase E[ω|ω ≥ ω∗] by expanding the full disclosure interval [0, ω∗].
4. Discrete State
In this section we assume that the state is a discrete random variable; that is, it can
take only a finite number of values.
Theorem 1′. Let V be S-shaped. Then, and only then, an optimal signal is stochastic
upper-censorship for all discrete F .
Under Assumption (A1) that imposes an additional structure on the sender’s utility,
we obtain the result analogous to Theorem 2.
Theorem 2′. Let (A1) hold and let the density g be log-concave. Then, and only
then, an optimal signal is stochastic upper-censorship for all discrete F and all ρ.
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Let us discuss how the comparative statics result (Theorem 3) changes. In Section
3.2, we argue that upper-censorship signals can be ordered by the comparison of
their censorship cutoffs. However, when the state is discrete, a censorship cutoff is
described by a pair (ω∗, q∗) where ω∗ is a cutoff state and q∗ is the probability of
revealing this cutoff state when it realizes.
Consider two stochastic upper-censorship signals s1 and s2 with cutoffs (ω
∗
1, q
∗
1) and
(ω∗2, q
∗
2). Denote (ω
∗
1, q
∗
1)  (ω∗2, q∗2) if ω∗1 > ω∗2, or ω∗1 = ω∗2 and q∗1 ≥ q∗2. Observe
that s1 is more (Blackwell) informative than s2 if and only if (ω
∗
1, q
∗
1)  (ω∗2, q∗2). This
comparison also applies to deterministic upper-censorship signals, with the constraint
that q∗1 and q
∗
2 are in {0, 1}.
Let (ω∗(ρ, t), q∗(ρ, t)) be the optimal stochastic upper-censorship cutoff. The state-
ment of Theorem 3 remains same, with respect to the above order on censorship
cutoffs:
Theorem 3′. Let (A1) hold. For all ρ and t
(a) (ω∗ (ρ, t) , q∗ (ρ, t)) is increasing in ρ,
(b) (ω∗ (ρ, t) , q∗ (ρ, t)) is increasing in t.
That is, the sender optimally discloses more information when she is less biased
relative to the receiver (the bias parameter ρ is greater), and when the receiver is
more reluctant to act (the shift parameter t is greater).
5. Application to Media Censorship
In this section, we apply our results to the problem of media censorship by the govern-
ment. In the contemporary world, people obtain information about the government’s
state through various media sources such as television, newspapers, and internet
blogs. Without the media, most people would not know what policies and reforms
the government pursues and how effective they are. Media outlets have different posi-
tions on the political spectrum and differ substantially in how they select and present
facts to cover the same news. People choose their sources of information based on
their political ideology and socioeconomic status. This information is valuable for
significant individual decisions in migration, investment, and voting, to name a few.
Individuals do not fully internalize externalities that their decisions impose on the
society. Likewise, the government may not have the society’s best interest at heart.
To further its goals, the government then wishes to influence individual decisions by
manipulating the information through media. In autocracies and countries with weak
checks and balances, the government has power to censor the media content.
The government’s problem of media censorship can be represented as the persuasion
problem in Section 2. We apply our results to provide conditions for the optimality
of upper-censorship policies that censor all media outlets except the most supportive
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ones. An interpretation of our comparative statics results is as follows. First, the gov-
ernment increases censorship if influencing society decisions becomes relatively more
important than maximizing individual welfare. Second, the government increases
censorship if the society experiences an ideology shock in favor of the government.
5.1. Setup. There is a continuum of heterogeneous citizens indexed by r ∈ [0, 1]
distributed with G. Each citizen chooses between a = 0 and a = 1. The utility of a
citizen of type r is given by
u(θ, r, ar, a¯) = (θ − r)ar + ξ(θ, r, a¯),
where ar ∈ {0, 1} denotes the citizen’s own action, a¯ =
∫
ardG(r) denotes the ag-
gregate action in the society, θ ∈ [0, 1] captures an unobserved benefit from action 1
as compared to action 0, and ξ captures the impact of the aggregate action a¯ on the
citizen’s utility. The term (θ − r)ar is a private surplus of a citizen of type r. The
term ξ(θ, r, a¯) is an externality, because for a citizen of type r it is optimal to ignore
this term and choose ar = 1 if and only if θ ≥ r.
There is a government which is concerned with a weighted average of the social utility
and the government’s intrinsic benefit from the aggregate action. For a given θ, the
government’s utility is given by
(1− δ)
∫ 1
0
ν(θ, r, ar, a¯)dG(r) + δγ(θ, a¯).
The term ν captures a citizen’s utility from the government’s perspective. We allow ν
to be different from u to reflect paternalistic or other concerns. The term γ captures
the government’s intrinsic benefit from the aggregate action. The parameter δ ∈ [0, 1]
captures a relative weight of the aggregate action in the government’s utility.
Let T be a distribution of the random variable θ. We assume that distributions G
and T are independent and admit continuously differentiable and strictly positive
densities g and τ . We also assume that β, γ, and ν are linear in θ and continuously
differentiable in r and a¯. Furthermore, to simplify interpretations, we assume that ν
and γ are non-decreasing in θ and a¯, so that for the government, a high θ is a good
news, and a higher aggregate action is preferable.
Citizens obtain information about the unobservable benefit θ through media outlets.
There is a continuum of media outlets. Each media outlet is identified by its editorial
policy c ∈ C = [0, 1], and it endorses action a = 1 if θ ≥ c and criticizes it if θ < c.5
The government’s censorship policy is a set of the media outlets X ⊂ C that are
permitted to broadcast; so the rest of the media outlets are censored.
The timing is as follows. First, the government chooses a set X ⊂ C of permitted
media outlets. Second, state θ is realized, and each permitted media outlet endorses
or criticizes action a = 1 according to its editorial policy. Finally, each citizen observes
5The tie-breaking in the event of θ = c is unimportant, as θ is a continuous random variable.
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messages from all permitted media outlets, updates his beliefs about θ, and chooses
an action.
5.2. Discussion. We now discuss interpretations of the key components of the media
censorship application. As in Gehlbach and Sonin (2014), there can be various inter-
pretations of the citizen’s action a = 1, such as voting for the government, supporting
a government’s policy, or taking an individual decision that benefits the government.
A citizen’s type r can be interpreted as his ideological position or preference para-
meter. A citizen who is more supportive of the government has a smaller r.
A media outlet with a higher editorial policy c can be interpreted as more disloyal
to the government because it criticizes the government on a larger set of states. An
editorial policy c ∈ C can therefore represent a slant or political bias of the outlet
against the government and can be empirically measured as the frequency with which
the outlet uses anti-government language. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) construct
such a slant index for U.S. newspapers. Empirical findings of their paper suggest that
the editorial policies of media outlets are driven by reader preferences, justifying our
assumption of the existence of a large variety of editorial policies.6 As in Suen (2004),
Chan and Suen (2008), and Chiang and Knight (2011), the assumption of the binary
media reports that communicate only whether the state θ is above some standard c
can be justified by a cursory reader’s preference for simple messages such as positive
or negative opinions and yes or no recommendations.
The government’s censorship of media outlets can take different forms. For example,
the government can ban access to internet sites, withdraw licenses, disrupt financing,
confiscate print materials and equipment, and discredit, arrest, or even murder editors
and journalists. In some countries, the government can exercise direct control over
media editorial policies either through state ownership or administrative pressure.
5.3. Formulating Media Censorship as Persuasion. We now show that the me-
dia censorship problem can be formulated as a linear persuasion problem, in which
the government is a sender and a representative citizen is a receiver.
Observe that the citizens’ and the government’s utilities are linear in θ. Therefore,
given any information from the media outlets, the utilities depend only on the pos-
terior mean of θ.
Consider an arbitrary posterior mean of θ, denoted by m ∈ [0, 1]. Each citizen of
type r chooses ar = 1 if and only if r ≤ m. The externality term β plays no role
in this decision. Therefore, the aggregate action a¯ is simply the mass of all citizens
whose types do not exceed m, so a¯ = G(m).
6Theoretical literature has explored the determinants of media slant of an outlet driven by its
citizens (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005, Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006, and Chan and Suen, 2008)
and its owners (Baron, 2006, and Besley and Prat, 2006).
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Next, using the citizens’ optimal behavior, we derive the government’s expected utility
conditional on the posterior mean m:
V (m) = E
[
(1− δ)
∫ 1
0
ν(θ, r, ar, G(m))dG(r) + δγ(θ,G(m))
∣∣∣∣m]
= (1− δ)
∫ 1
0
ν(m, r,1{r≤m}, G(m))dG(r) + δγ(m,G(m)). (5)
This is the government’s indirect utility. As in Section 2, the government now chooses
a signal which is informative about the state to maximize its expected utility. How-
ever, in contrast to Section 2, here the government is restricted to signals that are
implementable by a subset of a given set of media outlets.
Thus, the media censorship problem is equivalent to the persuasion problem in which
the sender is restricted to monotone partitions and the sender’s indirect utility V is
given by (5). Since deterministic upper-censorship is a monotone partition, we can
apply Theorem 1 to obtain the following result.
Theorem 1′′. If V is S-shaped, then an optimal censorship policy is deterministic
upper-censorship.
To illustrate Theorem 1′′, suppose the government is interested only in the aggregate
action, so that v = 0 and γ depends only on the aggregate action a¯; so V (m) =
γ(G(m)). Thus, an upper-censorship policy is optimal if the composition function
γ(G(·)) is S-shaped. For example, this condition holds if the government is interested
in reaching a certain approval threshold, so that γ is a step function. This condition
also holds if γ is S-shaped and G is uniform or S-shaped with the same inflection
point as γ.7
5.4. Constant Bias. We now impose more structure on the utilities to obtain a
sharper result for optimality of upper censorship and to perform a comparative stat-
ics analysis. Similarly to Section 3.1, we assume that the government’s utility is a
weighted average of the citizens’ utility and their aggregate action:
(1− δ)
∫ 1
0
u(θ, r, ar, a¯)dG(r) + δa¯,
where u(θ, r, ar, a¯) = (θ − r)ar + ζ(r)a¯
(A2)
for some continuously differentiable function ζ. Define
β = (1− δ)
∫ 1
0
ζ(r)dG(r) + δ.
The term (1−δ) ∫ 1
0
ζ(r)dG(r) is the government’s expected bias towards the citizens’
action a = 1 due to the citizens’ externality, and the term δ is the government’s
7This condition holds in many special cases where γ and G are S-shaped even when γ and G have
different inflection points.
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intrinsic bias towards a greater aggregate action a¯. Thus, we interpret β as the gov-
ernment’s aggregate bias. This decomposition of the bias allows for different inter-
pretations why the government is biased. So, β can be high because the government is
too self-serving (high δ), or because the government is benevolent (low δ) but wishes
to internalize strong positive externalities of the citizens (high ζ(r)). For the ease of
interpretation, we assume that β > 0.8
Under Assumption (A2), the government’s indirect utility V given by (5) becomes
V (m) = (1− δ)
∫ m
0
(m− r)dG(r) + βa¯ =
∫ m
0
v(m, r)dG(r),
where
v(m, r) = β
(
1 +
1− δ
β
(m− r)
)
.
This is the same as v given by Assumption (A1) with ρ = (1−δ)/β, up to rescaling by
a positive constant. Consequently, we can apply Theorem 2 to obtain the following
result.
Theorem 2′′. Let (A2) hold. If the density g of citizens’ types is log-concave, then
an optimal censorship policy is deterministic upper-censorship.
We now apply the comparative statics analysis presented in Section 3.2. Note that
the upper censorship policies are ordered according to the amount of information
transmitted to the citizens, in the sense of Blackwell (1953). A greater censorship
threshold c∗ means that the interval of states below c∗ where the readers receive best
possible information is greater, and the pooling interval of states above c∗ is smaller.
With this order in mind, we will make a comparative statics analysis on the amount
of information that is optimally disclosed by the government.
First, Theorem 3(a) states that the censorship cutoff is weakly increasing in ρ. Recall
that this is a reciprocal of the government’s bias, ρ = (1− δ)/β. This means that the
government optimally discloses more information (the censorship cutoff is greater)
when it is less biased (β is smaller). Intuitively, as β decreases, the government puts
more weight on the citizens’ utility, so it optimally endows the population with a
higher utility by censoring fewer media outlets and disclosing more information.
Second, Theorem 3(b) states that the censorship cutoff is weakly increasing in t.
Recall that parameter t is the magnitude of the horizontal shift of the density g (see
Section 3.2), so a greater t is a greater opportunity cost of action a = 1 for each
citizen. This means that the government optimally discloses more information (the
censorship cutoff is greater) when the citizens’ are more difficult to persuade to take
action a = 1 (parameter t is greater). Informally speaking, to persuade the same type
of the citizen, the government needs to increase the posterior mean. But the expected
8If β < 0, then swapping the roles of a = 0 and a = 1 reverses the sign of the bias. If β = 0,
then the government’s utility and the citizens’ private interests coincide, so it is trivially optimal to
disclose maximum information.
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posterior mean must be equal to the prior mean, so it is not possible to increase all
posterior means. Due to the log-concave shape of the density of the citizens’ types,
this tradeoff is resolved by increasing the posterior mean of the pooling interval,
E[ω|ω ≥ c∗]. This is done by shrinking the pooling interval [c∗, 1], that is, increasing
the censorship cutoff c∗.
5.5. Extensions and Open Questions. Let us now consider a few extensions of
our model of censorship.
In our model, the set of media outlets is exogenous, and the government’s only in-
strument is censorship. We now consider three alternative ways of expanding the
government’s instruments of influence.
First, suppose that the government is able not only to censor existing media outlets,
but also to introduce new media outlets with chosen editorial policies. This is equival-
ent to our censorship model where all media outlets in [0, 1] are initially available, and
the government can censor any subset of them. When all media outlets in [0, 1] are
permitted, the revealed information about θ (which we call ω) is θ itself. Thus, ω = θ
is a continuous random variable with distribution F = T . So, we can now apply our
results for the continuous state from Section 3 instead of those for the discrete state
in Section 4, reaching the same conclusion about the optimality of upper censorship.
Second, suppose that the government can garble information available from media
outlets. That is, the government is not restricted to monotone partitions, it can
create arbitrary signals about state ω for the citizens to observe. This becomes a
general persuasion problem, yet our Theorem 1 still applies.
Third, suppose that the government is able to restrict not only which media outlets
are permitted, but also how many media outlets each citizen can choose to observe.
In this extension the citizens are not allowed to communicate with one another (oth-
erwise they could share the information, thus observing all permitted media outlets
indirectly). This extension does not affect our results, as long as each citizen is al-
lowed to access at least one media outlet of his choice, as in Chan and Suen (2008).
Intuitively, this is because each citizen categorizes the information from the media
outlets into “good news” where a = 1 is optimal and “bad news” where a = 0 is
optimal. Because the information from the media outlets induces a monotone parti-
tion, it means that “good news” is separated from “bad news” by a threshold media
outlet that depends on the citizen’s type. That is, it is sufficient to observe a single
threshold media outlet to distinguish “good news” from “bad news”.
In our model, each citizen’s utility depends on the aggregate action a¯ through the
externality term β(θ, r, a¯) which does not affect the chosen action. Let us relax this
assumption, so that a citizen’s optimal choice can depend on a¯. We can still write
the sender’s indirect utility V as a function of the posterior mean state and apply our
results. However, now V is not uniquely determined by the primitives of the model.
It is endogenous and depends on an equilibrium the citizens play, as each citizen’s
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optimal action now depends on what all citizens do in equilibrium. For example,
given the same information about the state, a citizen could prefer to choose a = 1 if
and only if many enough citizens choose the same action, so a¯ is large enough. This
creates the problem of multiplicity of equilibria and, as a consequence, the dependence
of optimal censorship on equilibrium selection.
Our media censorship problem can be applied to spatial voting models, as in Chiang
and Knight (2011). Consider a government party (p = G) and an opposition party
(p = O) competing in an election. If party p wins, a voter with an ideological position
r gets utility wp − (r − rp)2, where wp is the quality or valence of party p, and rp is
the ideology or policy platform of party p. Voters know the parties’ ideologies and
obtain information about the parties’ qualities from all available media outlets. Each
voter supports the party that maximizes his expected utility. Our analysis applies,
because the voter’s utility difference between the government and opposition parties
is proportional to θ − r, where θ = (wG − wO + r2O − r2G) /2(rO − rG).
There are a few more extensions that can be relevant in applications. First, instead
of complete censorship of a media outlet, there could be a cost of accessing it. For
example, an international news channel could be censored by a local government, but
citizens could still access it through VPN at some cost. Second, it can be costly for
the government to censor media outlets, so an important question is how to prioritize
censoring. Finally, citizens could incur some cost of following each media outlet. We
already mentioned that citizens have no benefit in following more than one outlet. But
they might stop watching news altogether if the news is sufficiently uninformative.
These extensions are nontrivial and left for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Theorem 1 is a special case of Theorem 1′.
Proof of Theorem 1′. Each signal s induces a random variable m = E[ω|s], called
the posterior mean. Let H be the distribution of m induced by a signal. Because
the sender’s and receiver’s utilities are linear in the state, H summarizes all relevant
information about a signal.
The distribution H implements the receiver’s interim utility U given by
U(r) =
∫ 1
r
(m− r)dH(m) =
∫ 1
r
(1−H(m))dm for r ∈ [0, 1],
where the first equality holds because the receiver acts iff m ≥ r, and the second
equality holds by integration by parts. Notice that each such function U uniquely
determines H, so that H(m) = 1 +U ′(m) where U ′(m) is the right derivative of U at
m. Thus, we can represent each signal by U .
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A fully informative signal induces the distribution H of m equal to F , and thus
implements the interim utility given by
U(r) =
∫ 1
r
(1− F (m))dm for r ∈ [0, 1].
A completely uninformative signal induces the distribution H of m that assigns prob-
ability 1 to m = E[ω], and thus implements the interim utility given by
U(r) = max{E[ω]− r, 0} for r ∈ [0, 1].
r∗ω∗
V ′′(r)
U(r)
U(r)
U∗(r)
tangency point of U∗ and U
y∗
Figure 2. Upper-censorship with cutoff ω∗.
As follows from Theorem 1 in Kolotilin et al. (2017), there exists a signal that im-
plements U if and only if U(r) is convex on [0, 1] and U(r) ≤ U(r) ≤ U(r) for all
r ∈ [0, 1].
The sender’s expected utility given the posterior mean m is
V (m) =
∫ m
0
v(m, r)dG(r) for m ∈ [0, 1].
Using integration by parts, as in Lemma 2 in Kolotilin et al. (2017), we can rewrite
the sender’s expected utility to obtain the following result.
Lemma 2 (Kolotilin et al. 2017). An optimal signal implements
U∗ ∈ arg max
U
∫ 1
0
U(r)V ′′(r)dr
subject to U is convex and U ≤ U ≤ U ,
(6)
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where V ′′ is the second derivative of V .
The interim utility U∗ under an upper-censorship signal is shown as a black dashed
curve in Figure 2. A receiver of type r ≤ ω∗ knows whether ω ≥ r, and hence gets the
highest feasible utility U∗(r) = U(r), by choosing a = 1 whenever ω ≥ r. A receiver
of type r > ω∗ knows whether ω ≥ ω∗, and hence gets the utility
U∗(r) = max{m∗ − r, 0} · (1− F (ω∗) + Pr(ω = ω∗)(1− q∗)),
by choosing a = 1 whenever ω ≥ ω∗ and m∗ ≥ r.
Consider an S-shaped function V , so that there exists r∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that V ′′(r) ≥ 0
for r < r∗ and V ′′(r) ≤ 0 for r > r∗. Fix a value y∗ ∈ [U(r∗), U(r∗)]. Define
ω∗ ∈ [0, 1] and q∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that the interim utility U∗ satisfies U∗(r∗) = y∗ under
the corresponding upper-censorship signal. It is easy to see from Figure 2 that for
any convex U such that U ≤ U ≤ U and U(r∗) = y∗, we have U∗(r) ≤ U(r) for
r < r∗ and U∗(r) ≥ U(r) for r > r∗. Thus, by Lemma 2, an upper-censorship signal
is optimal.
Conversely, suppose that V is not S-shaped. Then there exist 0 ≤ r1 < r2 < r3 ≤ 1
such that V ′′(r) < 0 for r ∈ (r1, r2) and V ′′(r) > 0 for r ∈ (r2, r3), because V ′′ is
continuous by assumption. Thus, −V is S-shaped on the interval [r1, r3]. Consider
any F with the support equal to [r1, r3] and any upper-censorship signal. Let y
∗ be the
receiver’s utility of type r∗ under this signal. It is easy to see that the sender strictly
prefers a lower-censorship signal that gives the same utility y∗ to the receiver. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Observe that
(1− F (ω∗))dm
∗
dω∗
= f(ω∗)(m∗ − ω∗).
Using the above, we find the first-order condition of the problem (2): ω∗ ∈ [0, 1] is a
solution of (2) if it satisfies[
V (ω)− V (m∗) + V ′(m∗)(m∗ − ω)]f(ω) ≥ (≤) 0 for all ω ≤ (≥)ω∗. (7)
As f(ω) ≥ 0 for all ω, the above condition is weaker than (3). So ω∗ satisfying (3)
must be a solution of (2).
It remains to show that there exists ω∗ ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies (3). This is true, because
V is S-shaped, so the expression in (3) is single-crossing from above. To see this,
consider Fig. 1. Observe that (4) can hold only if ω∗ is on the convex part of V and
m∗ on the concave part of V . As the censorship cutoff ω∗ increases, the posterior
mean state of the pooling message m∗ also increases. But because V is concave at
m∗, the dashed tangent line becomes flatter, so it crosses the solid line at a smaller
ω. It follows that the expression in (4) is nonpositive for all ω > ω∗ and nonnegative
for all ω < ω∗. 
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Proof of Lemma 1. Notice that, under assumption (A1), we have
V ′′(r) = g′(r) + ρg(r) for r ∈ [0, 1].
Recall that V is S-shaped iff V ′′(r) = g′ (r) + ρg (r) is single-crossing from above. By
Proposition 1 in Quah and Strulovici (2012), this holds for all ρ ∈ R if and only if
g′ (r)/g (r) is nonincreasing in r (that is, ln g(r) is concave). 
Proof of Theorem 2. Immediate by Theorem 1 and Lemma 1. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider a signal that implements the interim utility U
(equivalently, the distribution H = 1 + U ′ of the posterior mean m). The sender’s
expected utility is then∫ 1
0
V (m)dH(m) =
∫ 1
0
∫ m
0
(1 + ρ(m− r))dG(r)dH(m)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
r
(1 + ρ(m− r))dH(m)dG(r)
=
∫ 1
0
(−U ′(r) + ρU(r))dG(r).
Part (a). Consider ρ2 > ρ1. Suppose to get a contradiction that the cutoffs of the
corresponding optimal upper-censorship signals are such that F (ω∗2) < F (ω
∗
1). Since
the sender prefers a signal that induces U2 under ρ2 and a signal that induces U1
under ρ1, we have∫
(−U ′2 (r) + ρ2U2 (r)) dG (r) ≥
∫
(−U ′1 (r) + ρ2U1 (r)) dG (r) ,∫
(−U ′1 (r) + ρ1U1 (r)) dG (r) ≥
∫
(−U ′2 (r) + ρ1U2 (r)) dG (r) .
Summing up these conditions gives:
(ρ2 − ρ1)
∫
(U2 (r)− U1 (r)) dG (r) ≥ 0,
leading to a contradiction to the fact that U2(r) ≥ U1(r) for all r with strict inequality
for some r, which follows from F (ω∗2) < F (ω
∗
1).
Part (b). It is easy to prove this part in the case where F admits a density or in
scenario (i). Indeed, we want to show that ω∗1 ≤ ω∗2 for t1 < t2. Since ω∗2 is optimal
under t2, we have
V (ω − t2) ≤ V (m∗2 − t2) + V ′(m∗2 − t2)(m∗2 − ω) for ω ∈ [ω∗2, 1]. (8)
For an S-shaped V , it is easy to see from a graph that the following inequality holds
V (ω − t1) ≤ V (m∗2 − t1) + V ′(m∗2 − t1)(m∗2 − ω) for ω ∈ [ω∗2, 1], (9)
which implies that ω∗1 ≤ ω∗2.
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Now consider the case where the sender chooses a monotone partition. Then the
difficulty arises because (8) does not have to hold if there is an atom at ω∗2. Let
m¯(ω∗, q∗) be the mean state of the pooling message in a given upper-censorship signal
(ω∗, q∗). To prove the result, we first need to notice that
V ∗t (ω
∗, q∗) =
∫
[0,ω∗)
V (ω − t)dF (ω) + V (ω∗ − t)q∗ Pr(ω = ω∗)
+ V (m¯(ω∗, q∗))((1− q∗) Pr(ω = ω∗) + 1− F (ω∗)),
is single-peaked in (ω∗, q∗) in the lexicographic order (Blackwell informativeness or-
der).
If (8) holds, then the previous proof goes through. If (8) is violated, then Pr(ω =
ω∗2) 6= 0 and q∗2 = 0, by single-peakedness of V ∗t . Moreover,
V (m¯(ω∗2, 0)− t2)(Pr(ω = ω∗2) + 1− F (ω∗2))
≥ V (ω∗2 − t2) Pr(ω = ω∗2) + V (m¯(ω∗2, 1)− t2)(1− F (ω∗2))
and
V (ω − t2) ≤ V (m¯(ω∗2, 1)− t2) + V ′(m¯(ω∗2, 1)− t2)(m¯(ω∗2, 1)− ω) for ω ∈ [ω∗2, 1],
again by single-peakedness of V ∗t .
Therefore, it suffices to show that
V (m¯(ω∗2, 0)− t1)(Pr(ω = ω∗2) + 1− F (ω∗2)) ≥
V (ω∗2 − t1) Pr(ω = ω∗2) + V (m¯(ω∗2, 1)− t1)(1− F (ω∗2)).
Moreover, it seems to suffice to show that if the inequality holds with equality for t2,
then the inequality holds for t1 = t2 − dt. This property is equivalent to
V ′(m¯(ω∗2, 0)− t2)(Pr(ω = ω∗2) + 1− F (ω∗2))
≥ V ′(ω∗2 − t2) Pr(ω = ω∗2) + V ′(m¯(ω∗2, 1)− t2)(1− F (ω∗2)),
which holds as can be seen from the graph representing the condition
V (m¯(ω∗2, 0)− t2)(Pr(ω = ω∗2) + 1− F (ω∗2))
= V (ω∗2 − t2) Pr(ω = ω∗2) + V (m¯(ω∗2, 1)− t2)(1− F (ω∗2)).
As a side, a clean proof of Alonso and Caˆmara (2016b) does not seem to be applicable,
as they have ρ = 0 and assume log-concavity of g. For their proof to be applicable,
we would need to assume that V ′(r) = g(r)+ρG(r) is log-concave, which cannot hold
for all ρ. 
Proof of Theorem 2′. Immediate by Theorem 1′ and Lemma 1. 
Proof of Theorem 3′. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 3. 
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